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These facts are mentioned to show that it is not safe to theorise too far unless the actual facts as ascertained by anthropological research are fully considered.

Book II. of Professor Baldwin's work is divided into three parts, which treat of the Social Forces, Social Organisation—which is regarded as being due to a continuation of the two-fold exercise of the imitative function on which the growth of the individual's "self-thought" is dependent—and Social Progress. As to this we can say only that it is declared to be "necessarily in the direction of the realisation of ethical standards and rules of conduct." This work proper, after a chapter dealing with rules of conduct, concludes with a General Retrospect of the relations between the society and the individual. In a series of Appendices, the views of Professor Royce and other writers on kindred topics are considered in some detail, adding much to the value of a very important and highly suggestive work, on the completion of which Professor Baldwin may be congratulated.

C. STANILAND WAKE.

OUTLINES OF SOCIOLOGY. By *Lester F. Ward*. Author of *Dynamic Sociology*, *The Psychic Factors of Civilisation*, etc. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1898. Pages, xii, 301.

This volume is substantially a reprint of twelve lectures given by the author at the School of Sociology of the Hartford Society for Education Extension in 1895, and printed subsequently in the *American Journal of Sociology*. It is dedicated to Dr. Albion W. Small, "the first to draw attention to the educational value of my social philosophy, the staunch defender of my method in sociology, and to whom the prior appearance of these chapters is due." This dedication at once draws attention to what are the two most important points in connexion with any philosophic system—its principles and its practical value, and these points will engage our attention. The first part of Mr. Ward's work is devoted to the consideration of Social Philosophy, and the second part to that of Social Science, although the author states in the Preface, somewhat inconsistently, that "the earlier chapters may be regarded as aiming to show what sociology is not, while the later ones have for their object to set forth in broad outlines what sociology is." The latter will undoubtedly be the more interesting to the general reader, although the earlier chapters are by no means of a purely negative character, and may be considered as introductory to the treatment of the actual subject, and essential to the educational object the author has in view.

In dealing with the positive aspect of sociology, Mr. Ward very properly treats the "social forces" as natural forces, for which he would find authority in the teaching of Lord Bacon if such were needed, and it might be supposed, from the title he has given to the second part of his work, that he regarded sociology chiefly as a matter of science. This would be a mistake, however, as *apart from its applications*, which constitute art, science is a mere "knowing" and not of much real use. Sociology is thus on its practical side the "social art," and the author, in ac-

cordance with this view, affirms that true legislation is *invention*. Actual legislation is rather prevention than invention, but it is declared to be faulty, as natural forces ought to be utilised instead of being checked and curbed. The aim of government, as "the art that results from the science of society through the legislative application of sociological principles," is the modification of the phenomena so as to serve man, which requires first the perception of the proper modes and then "the necessary adjustments to secure the useful end." The difficulty with this view is, that it regards society as a kind of Garden of Eden where the plants require only to be cultivated to bring forth good fruit, although otherwise they would run wild. It does not allow for the fact that there are weeds which require preventive treatment, the correspondents to which in human life are the hereditary criminals, those who have a tendency to do evil, not only through acquired habit, but also by defective structural organisation. Moreover, although such men and women may be regarded as survivals of, or rather from, an earlier stage of human progress, that of almost pure savagery, yet it cannot be denied that the average man only too often shows much the same spirit in his dealings with his fellows. Greed of some sort is the source of most of our social evils and a great proportion of legislation and judicial administration is directed towards preventing or remedying its action. Mr. Ward thinks that, notwithstanding the "inane flounderings" of the American House of Representatives, which show how little reason has to do with democratic legislation, democracy has solved the moral side of the question of government, seeing that it *wishes well* for the people. What is wanted is increased intelligence, and the author's conclusion is that "if the social consciousness can be so far quickened as to awake to the full realisation of this truth in such vivid manner as to induce general action in the direction of devising means for the universal equalisation of intelligence, all other social problems will be put in the way of gradual but certain solution." This reads as though intelligence, like wealth, was accumulated in a comparatively few hands, and that if a kind of mental irrigation could be brought about by distribution of the accumulations all social evils would be remedied. That view does not speak well for the school system which is supposed to have made the Americans the most generally intelligent of peoples, and it is hardly consistent with the fact that, notwithstanding the spread of education, the moral outlook is by no means encouraging. To say nothing of the lack of moral fibre shown by the great number of divorces which take place, the increase in crime keeps pace with that of wealth rather than that of education, and we are compelled, therefore, to believe that something more than increased intelligence is required to ensure the solution of the existing social problems.

That Mr. Ward takes the right view as to the nature of intellect when he speaks of it as the directive agent, that which guides the feelings, cannot be denied. The intellect is the telic power which has given man the control of the vegetable and animal kingdoms and finally of the physical agencies at work in nature, and it is supposed to have been developed as "an aid to the will for the better satisfac-

tion of desire." Intelligence is the process of "converting means into ends," that is for obtaining what is desired. But what is to ensure that the desire shall deserve to be thus gratified? Morality is not wholly altruistic. Moreover, intelligence and reason are not the same, although they appear to be so regarded by Mr. Ward, who errs also in his view as to the origin of intellect and therefore of reason. When considering the question whether animals can reason, he speaks of the great intelligence of certain animals as favoring an affirmative answer, and in fact he places the "intellectual" attributes in opposition to the affective faculties, giving the rational faculty to the former. But what are called the beginnings of reason in the dog, elephant, and other animals are merely evidences of a high degree of intelligence. Reason, as thus distinguished, requires for its action the use of symbols such as are embodied in human speech, or in the more refined language of mathematics. This Mr. Ward speaks of as a purely human power—although he speculates on the possibility of some animals being able to say certain words and having an articulate language—and reasoning, properly so called, must be regarded as a purely human attribute. Reason has much the same relation to intellect as self-consciousness has to consciousness. The author quotes with approval Schopenhauer's statement that animals have consciousness but live without *Besonnenheit*, which he says "seems to touch the kernel of the problem." It is true that the German philosopher speaks, in the language of his time, of self-consciousness as an intellectual process, but it is evident that he regarded it as requiring thought, and this is not possible without the use of the symbols which are usually referred to as the instruments of reasoning and which are essential to it. The distinction between intellect and reason is really made by the author himself when he speaks of the "higher powers of introspection, speculation, reflexion, abstraction, and generalisation which characterise the developed mind of man." The undeveloped mind of man possesses these powers to some extent, but they are wanting to the animal mind, although it may exhibit great intellectual activity, even in the choice of means to ends. The practical application of the matter is that the solution of the social problems which, as we have seen, Mr. Ward believes will be attained through the "equalisation of intelligence," must be sought for in the rationalising of intelligence, that is, not merely its wider diffusion, but the clarification, the illumination, of the intellect, so that it may become conscious of the higher aims of human life and make choice of the best means of realising them. The result will be "the general differentiation of the faculties and refinement of the mental and moral organisation of the race," which the author speaks of as accompanying the development of self-consciousness, and it is merely a continuance of the process which Schopenhauer, in a passage quoted in the work under review, declares to originate the philosopher, the artist, and the poet, who are led to the contemplation of the world by the clearness with which they become conscious of it through the illuminating influence of *Besonnenheit*.

Much might be said with reference to Mr. Ward's opinion as to the action of

natural selection and the effect produced over organic existences by intellect in removing competition. We prefer to make a few remarks in relation to his view as to the origin of the intellect. He accepts, with reserve, Schopenhauer's statement that the intellect is an accident, and yet "it had a natural origin and was brought forth as a means of advancing nature's ends"; although it finally took upon itself to counteract the law of nature, by opposing the competitive system, and replacing it by the law of reason. Here is a confounding of reason with intellect, which in its choice of means and motives is strictly competitive, and thus it is the former attribute which is supposed to be accidental. The fortuitous origin of reason is consistent with Mr. Ward's earlier declaration that "while there is a cause for all things there is no intelligent reason why anything should be as it is." The initiative which led to "the plan of structure of organic forms" is said to be fortuitous. But how can a *plan* be regarded as in any sense fortuitous, and the very fact insisted on by the author, as being in favor of the meliorism which he rightly considers to form the true state rather than either optimism or pessimism, that all nature is a domain "of rigid law, of absolute impartiality," proves that his notion of fortuity is erroneous. Nature is organised throughout, and her structural arrangements are the necessary results of the operation of the principles which have governed the whole course of evolution from its very beginning.

The defects here pointed out do not, curiously enough, affect Mr. Ward's general position, which is that the amelioration of the social condition of humanity must be sought for in the exercise of man's highest mental attributes. Man has been able, through the enlightening influence of reason, to subjugate much of external nature to his purposes and thus to change the character of his environment, and now he has to do the same for his own nature, which requires effective control and guidance. The individual and society act and react on each other, and the author is right in making psychology the basis of sociology and in seeing its principles operative in the process of social evolution. While not prepared to endorse all Mr. Ward's statements, we think that his views in relation to that process and the purposes of sociology are, subject to the remarks, already made, incontrovertible, and in our estimation, therefore, his work deserves attentive study.

C. STANILAND WAKE.

EMPIRISCHE PSYCHOLOGIE NACH NATURWISSENSCHAFTLICHER METHODE. Von *Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch*. Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss. 1898. Pages xvi, 355. Price, 6 M.

The *Empirische Psychologie* is not a new book, but the reprint of a work which appeared in 1842. The publisher informs the reader that the new edition has been published on the basis of an agreement with the heirs, and that the late Professor Drobisch who would not permit an unrevised edition to appear during his life-time had expressly given his consent to a posthumous reprint. The reader, accordingly, must bear in mind that the book is an historical document, and not a psychology,